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Introduction 
 
 
Post-election Tunisia: Security Issues as a 
Threat to Democratisation 
Germany Should Help Reform and Strengthen the Security Sector 
Christian Mölling and Isabelle Werenfels 
Tunisia is the only Arab state currently undergoing a democratic transition. But this pro-
cess is unfolding under increasingly difficult conditions. The economic crisis and the 
security challenges posed by armed Islamists are exacerbating one another. If Germany 
does not wish to see a reversal of the political achievements in which it has invested 
so much, and in order to uphold Tunisia as a beacon for the region, it will have to consid-
erably expand its cooperation on both economic and security issues. Broad and rapid 
measures aimed at increasing the efficiency and accountability of the security sector 
could present a positive counterexample to last-ditch arms deliveries to conflict regions. 
 
Tunisia’s development towards democracy 
is a clear but fragile process. The parlia-
mentary elections in October 2014 – the 
country’s first since adopting a new demo-
cratic constitution – were hailed as exem-
plary. The big winner was the secularist 
Nidaa Tounes party. Its candidate, Beji Caid 
Essebsi, also won the first round of presi-
dential elections in November 2014, closely 
followed by current President, Moncef 
Marzouki. The latter was backed by many 
voters of the moderate Islamist Ennahdha 
party, which emerged from the elections 
as the second strongest political force. 
These election results are partly the out-
come of a polarised election campaign that 
played on secular/Western and Islamic-
conservative cleavages in society. But there 
are strong incentives for both political 
camps to stick to the path of consensus and 
democratisation. These include: the positive 
experience of having reached a broad con-
sensus on the new constitution in early 
2014; ongoing pressure from a strong civil 
society; and, last but not least, a desire to 
avoid the kind of chilling developments 
seen in other “Arab Spring” countries. 
The downward spiral 
Since 2012, however, the outlook has been 
clouded by the interrelated problems of the 
economic crisis and the increasingly tense 
security situation. Key indicators such as 
growth, debt level, balance of trade, and 
foreign investment offer little hope of a 
quick recovery. In particular, the high youth 
unemployment of over 40 percent (2012) 
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and the associated lack of prospects provide 
fertile ground for religious radicalisation. 
Moreover, the presence of violent Salafists 
deters foreign investors and tourists, thus 
deepening the economic crisis still further. 
Security concerns were one reason why the 
credit rating agency Moody’s downgraded 
Tunisia twice in 2013. 
The turmoil which followed the over-
throw of dictator Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali in 
2011 substantially weakened the security 
apparatus. Criminals and violent Salafists 
greatly increased their activities within this 
security vacuum. Since late 2012, Jihadist 
extremism has become an obvious problem 
in Tunisia. Armed cells linked with the 
Algerian al-Qaida in the Maghreb and the 
Tunisian Ansar ash-Shariah have killed 
dozens of security personnel in areas near 
the Algerian border. In other regions too 
there are regular clashes between security 
forces and militant cells, as well as (thwart-
ed) attacks on tourist and other targets. 
Because there is no effective security 
along the 459 km border with Libya, the 
conflicts in that country adversely affect 
the security situation in Tunisia. Organised 
crime and (arms) smuggling flourish. Above 
all, however, Libya is a safe haven and a hub 
for militant Tunisians travelling to Syria and 
Iraq. Although Tunisia is a small country, 
with a population of just under 11 million, 
the roughly 3,000 Tunisian Jihadists repre-
sent one of the largest contingents of foreign 
fighters in Syria. They are also a risk to 
domestic security, with some 400 of them 
already believed to have returned home. 
As security problems grow, so too does 
the threat of renewed repression. The 
closure of various religious media plat-
forms and arrests of religious NGO mem-
bers in summer 2014 walked a fine line 
between decisive action against radicals 
and the restriction of free speech. 
Ultimately, the deeper the socioeconomic 
crisis and the more insecure people feel in 
their everyday lives, the less they identify 
with democratisation: a poll by the Pew Re-
search Center showed a drop from 63 percent 
in 2012 to 48 percent in 2014 in the propor-
tion of Tunisians who believe that democra-
cy is superior to other forms of government. 
The continued success of the political trans-
formation therefore very much depends on 
increasing the efficiency and accountability 
of the security sector within functioning 
constitutional, legal and policy parameters. 
Capability and governance deficits 
The Tunisian security sector has undergone 
reform in certain areas since 2011: units 
of the political police have been disbanded 
and provisions introduced for the protec-
tion of human rights; greater legal security 
for detainees has been enshrined in law; and 
security sector personnel are now allowed 
to form trade unions. However, there have 
yet to be comprehensive structural reforms 
that could create a new security culture 
by meeting capability requirements on the 
one hand, and solving governance prob-
lems on the other. 
The armed forces are well-regarded by 
the population at large, thanks to their 
neutrality during and after the revolution. 
However, the decades of shabby treatment 
they endured under former dictator Ben 
Ali continues to affect them. The very small 
force of some 35,000 men is short of every-
thing it needs to improve border security: 
apart from training, it especially lacks 
equipment, including such basics as vehi-
cles and communication devices. By con-
trast, the Jihadists have modern equipment 
and satellite communications. The effec-
tiveness of the armed forces is also under-
mined by resignations of high-ranking 
officers and controversial new appoint-
ments, as well as breakdowns in coordina-
tion and communication within the mili-
tary intelligence service. 
The police and civilian intelligence ser-
vices, on the other hand, have problems of 
governance and reputation due to the role 
they played in the former police state. The 
structures and organisation of the interior 
ministry remain insufficiently transparent. 
Figures available for the personnel strength 
of this ministry, which is responsible for 
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domestic security, range from 40,000 to over 
80,000. Since 2011, the ministry has been 
worn down by internal turf wars between 
actors of the old system and reformers. With 
the election victory of the Nidaa Tounes party 
– which includes former elite members of 
the Ben Ali regime – comes the risk of re-
newed political support for old regime ac-
tors and practices within the ministry. Also, 
low pay makes the security personnel vul-
nerable to corruption. Last but not least, the 
disbandment of the political police in 2011, 
while necessary, has reduced the security 
services’ capacity to monitor radical actors. 
Reviving the security partnership 
Since Tunisia cannot remedy these short-
comings on its own, the government is 
urgently lobbying Western states for rapid 
support. Alongside the EU, Germany in 
particular has supported the Tunisian tran-
sition with funds, expertise and diplomatic 
gestures as part of its transformation part-
nership. By strengthening civil society, it 
has contributed to the success of the de-
mocratisation process so far. 
Germany can now support long-term 
democratisation and economic develop-
ment by strengthening the security sector 
as well. Primarily this means enabling the 
security forces to enforce the state’s monopo-
ly on the legitimate use of force, based on 
accountability, the respect for human rights 
and the rule of law. As a result, the state 
would also be more effective in countering 
acts of terrorism. 
In 2012 Germany and Tunisia established 
a security partnership. Expanding this hith-
erto modest cooperation would be a chance 
for Germany to “get it right” in Tunisia – es-
pecially in light of the debate on accepting 
greater international responsibility. Firstly, 
making a commitment now would have a 
preventive effect. This would be in contrast 
to other cases, in which external actors have 
waited until the security situation was so 
hopeless that ad-hoc arms deliveries seemed 
to be the only option left (despite dubious 
effectiveness and obvious risks). 
Secondly, conditions in Tunisia are bet-
ter than in other Arab countries to which 
Germany exports equipment. Tunisia is not 
an authoritarian state; it is a small state 
that is successfully democratising, with 
functioning institutions. Its society is eth-
nically and religiously homogeneous, and 
there is little risk of civil war leading to 
proliferation of weapons. Therefore, sup-
port for Tunisia has good prospects of suc-
cess. It would also showcase the strengths 
which German foreign and security policy 
wishes to be renowned for: delivering train-
ing, education and equipment as a com-
prehensive package, underpinned by politi-
cal and economic measures to strengthen 
stability and democracy. 
Packaged measures 
The EU has identified the deficits in the 
Tunisian security sector and its border pro-
tection, and has made recommendations 
that could provide remedies. But these have 
yet to be implemented. The EU member 
states agree that Tunisia is important. How-
ever, in terms of security policy their actions 
have been mainly symbolic and coordina-
tion has been poor. Furthermore, a major 
driver for arms exports is lacking, namely 
business interest in doing trade with Tuni-
sia. It would be a shame to miss the oppor-
tunity to reform and strengthen the Tuni-
sian security sector because European 
policy makers did not act quickly enough 
in the absence of this driver. So as not to 
waste any more time, Germany should take 
proactive leadership. 
Coordination: Germany is well-placed to 
coordinate security cooperation at national 
and international levels – including with 
non-EU states like the United States and 
Turkey, which are already actively support-
ing the Tunisian security sector. By being 
completely open with its partners about its 
own involvement, Germany can legitimate-
ly demand more transparency from them 
in order to avoid costly duplication of aid 
from different countries. Closer coordina-
tion with France in particular would be 
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effective. Initiatives like the joint visit to 
Tunis by the German and French foreign 
ministers in April 2014 might also be use-
fully undertaken by the interior and/or 
defence ministers. 
In Germany, meanwhile, responsibilities 
and resources of government departments 
could be coordinated more effectively. The 
fact that Tunisia is progressing so slowly in 
making formal requests should be Germa-
ny’s cue to help the country overcome bu-
reaucratic hurdles. It would make sense to 
incorporate greater security cooperation 
with Tunisia into the existing transforma-
tion partnership, so as to promote democ-
racy over repression. Clearly, therefore, 
delivery of equipment should be tied to 
security sector reform. 
Governance of the security sector. What is 
required in this area is a substantial expan-
sion of current collaborative efforts with a 
view to: increasing the effectiveness of the 
respective Ministries, the security forces 
and the intelligence services by strengthen-
ing decision-making and implementation 
capacities that are effective and trans-
parent; and supporting increased oversight 
of the security sector by parliament and 
citizens so as to firmly establish the rule of 
law and human rights. Support for intelli-
gence reform ought to be contingent upon 
a strict separation between policing and 
intelligence functions, so as to contribute 
to the emergence of democratic intelli-
gence governance. A package such as this 
would increase the effectiveness of the 
security apparatus – not least because it 
would build public trust in it. 
Border protection. In order to set up an 
integrated border regime, Tunisia needs 
support in the form of equipment, knowl-
edge transfer, training, and additional eco-
nomic measures to increase local accept-
ance. Border protection can only work if 
non-government local authorities (e.g. tribal 
leaders) are included in the fight against 
smuggling, and if border regions are of-
fered viable economic substitutes. 
To secure its border with Libya, Tunisia 
requires vehicles for carrying out controls, 
equipment for monitoring satellite com-
munications, and reconnaissance sensors 
(including mobile devices installed in drones 
or vehicles). This will afford them compre-
hensive and precise coverage of all border 
areas. 
It would also be worth considering a 
role for Algeria in cooperation with Tuni-
sia. Since the two states share common 
and growing security challenges, they are 
already cooperating closely. Germany could 
issue additional licences to Algeria so that 
it can extend its current production of Ger-
man armoured vehicles to supply some to 
Tunisia. This would have a doubly positive 
outcome: aid to Tunisia would be made 
more effective; and Algeria would be in-
volved in a constructive way without further 
strengthening the repressive capabilities 
of this problematic partner. 
The German government could accelerate 
the decommissioning of already identified 
surplus equipment, especially vehicles, 
which could then be handed over to Tunisia. 
Furthermore, since old German equipment 
delivered to Tunisia a long time ago is no 
longer usable due to lack of maintenance, 
German companies can help make this 
equipment serviceable again. At the same 
time, Tunisians can be trained to service 
the equipment themselves in the future. 
Outlook 
Such a comprehensive commitment in 
Tunisia would be costly and not without 
risk; and closer security cooperation should 
not be a substitute for strengthening eco-
nomic ties. However, economic development 
greatly depends on a stable security situa-
tion. Progressive destabilisation, resulting 
in political setbacks in Tunisia, would end 
up costing Europe even more than the meas-
ures suggested here. Failure of the Tunisian 
transition would impact negatively not 
only on security, but also on the political 
development of the entire region. Democra-
tisation would then no longer be a realistic 
option in the Arab world for years to come. 
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